By Ethan Harvey
Last Sunday, another state election graced Germany, this time in Brandenburg, a territory surrounding Berlin that was once the core of the old Kingdom of Prussia, a historic area known for its castles, estates, and small towns. This region, with its rich history of left-leaning politics and strong connections with Willy Brandts Ostpolitik, a policy of détente that led to the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe, is a significant part of Germany's political landscape.
It is for this reason remarkable that the anti-establishment party, Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), classified as a 'suspected extremist organisation' by the German intelligence authorities, broke through in such a historic fortress for social democracy. Remarkably, it swept 30.7% of the vote, falling just 26,000 votes short of the SDP. This comes after positive results in state elections in Thuringia and Saxony, where the AfD placed first and second, respectively. Similarly, the AfD’s anti-establishment left-wing counterpart, the newly founded far-left Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht alliance (BSW), is also on the march in Eastern Germany, having achieved 16% of the vote in Thuringia and 11% in Saxony.
These significant manifestations underpin a growing discontent with the German political system, establishment, and status quo. The collapse of the established parties in Germany, the SPD, Liberals, and Greens, with the latter two no longer having representation in Thuringia, Saxony, or Brandenberg, demonstrates a paradigm shift that is beginning to take effect in Germany. This exact change has occurred across Europe, with countries such as France and the rise of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, turning to populist nationalism to cure its economic malaise and unproductivity.
"The growth of the AfD and BSW does not resemble a unification in support of a new ideology in Europe. Instead, a general discomfort with neoliberalism has inspired widespread repudiation of Scholz’s coalition."
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who leads the traffic light coalition, has reached an advanced stage of collapse. The collapse of the SDP in the EU elections, one of Germany's two main political parties, revealed the ascendancy of the AfD in Eastern Germany. Far-right ideology does not motivate this shift in support from SDP to AfD. The far left is also on the rise, with the BSW galvanising traditional working-class left-wing voters disillusioned with the liberal order inflicted on Germany since reunification. They believe that pooling resources to the EU centre fostered economic stagnation, such as the policy of EU centralisation furthered under Merkle’s watch. This has led the elite political class in Germany to paper over the cracks of economic vulnerabilities by depoliticising the political system and transferring power away from Berlin to Brussels, rather than addressing the root cause of the issue. For instance, the elites transferred the responsibility of immigration policy to the EU, which affirms the free movement of people under the Schengen agreement, a policy the AfD argue has induced cultural unrest and fragility.
Similarly, Germany’s economic policy is failing, leading to an overreliance on its unreformed heavy industry, which engenders the threat of the mass departure of the local population. It is the cultural, political, and economic dilemmas – which have been ignored by the ruling class and left to aggravate as Germany has become less sovereign – that have induced the sudden surge in support for anti-establishment parties. The growth of the AfD and BSW does not resemble a unification in support of a new ideology in Europe. Instead, a general discomfort with neoliberalism has inspired widespread repudiation of Scholz’s coalition. It is not the ideology of far-right or far-left that has enthused people to vote for the AfD and BSW, but rather a collective sense of disenchantment with the ruling class who have presided over a nation on the brink of recession.
The mood of disaffection in the electorate extends further. Even before its economic crisis, Germany's growth was underwhelming, and people were beginning to gauge the political system culpable, with the actors having little agency in the bureaucratic EU structure that prevents nation-states from addressing rudimentary issues. This feeling has resulted in a change in voting behaviour in Eastern Germany. Unlike Western Germany, the East is more willing to seek alternatives as it does not have the same tribal allegiance to the parties that make up the political system, inherited from the West after unification.
Yet despite Western Germany’s parental affiliation with the mainstream parties, there is growing discontent with the status quo, with the BSW galvanising support. However, this is unlikely to take a toll on the CDU, the main opposition party in Germany, given that the Catholic areas in Western Germany are united to support it. This may change if the CDU proceeds with the spiritless politics of the traffic light coalition, which could further ostracise voters in conservative West German areas to vote AfD concertedly in defiance of the old order.
Delineating the ascendancy of the AfD requires one to contextualise the political and economic trajectory that Germany has taken under twenty years of Merkelism. Having served as German Chancellor from 2005 to 2021, Angela Merkel’s policies have led to the current structural immobilism that inhibits Germany today.
Despite previously having been able to capitalise on captive markets in the European Union and cheap energy imports from Russia, aiding economic growth, Germany has become exhausted of the former and withdrawn from the latter. This malaise fermented by a lack of political ingenuity has convinced working people, victims of unfettered neoliberalism and hyper-globalisation, that the AfD, which offers an alternative, is the only way out.
Economically, the party has sought to return to a market-based system, whilst its foreign policy detaches itself from the unpopular pro-war mantra the elites espouse. It instead prefers negotiations with Russia to de-escalate the war in Ukraine and rekindle Germany's relations with Putin. This would stabilise the German economy by bringing back cheap energy, which ceased after the sabotage of Nord Stream 2, a pipeline that provided natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea. It would also reduce energy costs for ordinary Germans, which BSW voters recognise. Culturally, it seeks to bring down levels of immigration, which AFD politician Björn Höcke depicted as the ‘mother of all crises.’
The nationalist, pro-German mentality in the AfD voter's psyche coincides with the BSW, which is similarly cynical with mass migration and pro-war policies. The fact that both the far left and right have ascended in Germany suggests that the phenomenon is not ideologically motivated. Instead, it manifests from an organic disillusionment with the ruling class, which has enshrined a broken liberal paradigm that outsources its problems to the EU centre. For instance, it was Angela Merkle who initiated multiculturalism in her patronising ‘We Can Do This’ campaign in 2015, which let over a million migrants into the country. Höcke refers to Merkle’s porous borders, a policy that follows the Schengen agreement, when explaining why ‘crime is on the rise’, 'schools are bursting at the seams’ and ‘German culture is under threat.’
But can the AFD win the federal election in a year? It is unlikely. Even though it achieved a third of the vote in Thuringia, nine points ahead of the conservative CDU, and is second in the national opinion polls, it is unlikely to form a national government. The CDU will win the federal election, with Scholz’s SPD marginally represented in the Thuringia and Saxony state parliaments. Meanwhile, his coalition partners, the Greens and Liberals, were absent, failing to reach the 5% threshold required for representation.
Scholz, petrified about the new dawn of AfD support, has instructed the other parties to work together to stop the party from accumulating power. The old order has called this a ‘firewall,’ in which the mainstream centre and leftist parties combine to prevent them from getting into local or national government.
Whilst this may be a positive signal for Scholz, that the ‘far right’ threat of the AfD can be restrained, this short-term strategy, which some perceive as anti-democratic, fails to register the conscience of the German people. It is the political system, they argue, that has fostered an environment in which the deliberation requisite for change cannot transpire. Consolidating a political firewall to stop these parties from representing the interests of their supporters is not only antithetical to democracy but also inflames existing tensions among communities. Suppose it is extremism that the political class wants to avert. In that case, it should focus not on smearing AfD and BSW voters but on attempting to understand why people have developed this anti-establishment fervour and cultivate a long-term plan to address the issues which have led to cultural and economic restlessness.
It should begin by dismantling the old liberal paradigm that relies on outsourcing problems to the EU centre and, instead, return sovereignty to Germany. This means devising growth-driven economic policies that inspire innovation and wealth creation. At the same time, it should disengage from foreign conflicts such as the Ukraine War and focus on improving energy security. This can provide the political space for improving living standards and reducing the cost of living. Culturally, it should reverse Merkle’s policy of open borders, ensuring that the harmonisation required for a flourishing, cohesive society can transpire, where local infrastructure is not under strain and communities can integrate for stability.
Interestingly, Scholz grudgingly conceded that resolving these issues may be a better way to stop the AfD, having suspended Schengen, which promotes the free movement of people, for six months. Despite this, voters can see through Scholz’s political opportunism, suspecting that this is merely smoke and mirrors designed as a short-term spectacle to manipulate potential AfD and BSW voters into sticking with the legacy system.
This policy, interpreted as a bait-and-switch, is a red herring that will dissolve once the establishment claims victory. On the other hand, it inadvertently legitimises support for the AfD, a party which similarly seeks an end to Schengen, albeit permanently. If the policy succeeds, it could come back to haunt Scholz if more voters flock to the AfD in lust for further migration controls.
Overall, while the AfD may be obstructed from establishing meaningful representation at a federal level, Germany's rebellious political climate is unlikely to change until the elites directly address the underlying symptoms that caused its current state of cultural, economic, and political decline. Understanding the provocations behind the rise in AfD support, rather than ignorantly shrugging the issue away, can help reverse whatever stimulated the anti-establishment sentiment in the first place.
Image: Flickr
For an article that talks in depth about the BSW and AFD, there is a shockingly small amount of talk about immigration. You are correct to point out a dissatisfaction with the liberal elite, but this apathy and lost faith stems from the Kenya's coalition inability to tackle what East German's perceive as one of the gravest issues