By Ramiz Ahmadzada
Since Azerbaijan’s decisive military victory in the Second Karabakh War in late 2020, relations between the Southern Caucasian republic and France have been in a state of crisis. Within six weeks, Armenian troops, condemned by the UN Security Council for occupying Karabakh, an internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, were comprehensively defeated by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The Armenian occupation forces facilitated the mass murder of 16,000 Azerbaijani civilians, the forced expulsion of a further 700,000 in the early 1990s, and the destruction of formerly majority-Azerbaijani towns, the largest of which, Aghdam, even received the nickname ‘Hiroshima of the Caucasus’. However, France has not been as welcoming of Azerbaijan restoring its territorial integrity.
Prior to Emmanuel Macron’s rise to the French Presidency in 2017, France was a major player in talks to peacefully settle the Karabakh conflict as a permanent member of the OSCE Minsk Group alongside the United States and Russia and maintained decent relations with Azerbaijan. Previous French Presidents had met their Azerbaijani counterparts and discussed a possible peaceful solution to the conflict. But after Azerbaijan expelled occupying forces from her territories per Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the French government quickly took a negative approach towards Baku. On November 25 2020, just two weeks after a ceasefire ended the Second Karabakh War, the French Senate adopted a resolution calling for the diplomatic recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR)’, an illegitimate entity not recognised by any UN member, including Armenia, as an independent state. Over the following four years, the Senate continued to pass various resolutions calling for sanctions against Azerbaijan and the recognition of ‘NKR.’ On January 1 2024, the so-called ‘NKR’ dissolved itself; however, a fortnight later, the French Senate claimed that this dissolution had somehow not taken place. As the upper house of the French Parliament, the Senate resolutions formally held no legally binding power, but regardless, they had caused tensions between Baku and Paris. President Macron's approach has hardly been less confrontational. In October 2023, he claimed, “France has no problem with Azerbaijan, but Azerbaijan seems to have a problem with international law,” even though Azerbaijan had abided by international law and the resolutions of both the UNSC and the General Assembly in Karabakh, something which cannot be said for French actions in New Caledonia. The French government has been condemned of violating the basic rights of the Kanak people, the indigenous population of the Pacific Island, by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Experts specifically condemned France for attempting to dismantle the Noumea Accord, a promise made by the French government back in 1998 to increase the political powers of the Kanaks. In response, local Kanaks began protesting the backtracks on the agreements made by President Macron’s government on May 13 2024, met with violent crackdowns by French security forces.
Three days after protests began, French Minister of Interior Gerald Darmanin accused Azerbaijan of supporting the Kanak protestors and ‘making a deal with the native separatists’ In 2023, the Baku Initiative Group, a NGO, was set up to support the struggles for freedom of people living under neocolonial rule. The group has established partnerships with indigenous communities in French colonies branded as ‘overseas territories’ and has hosted international conferences dedicated to human and cultural rights of native groups. The Baku Initiative Group supported the Kanak people during the May 2024 protests and the Azerbaijani government clarified it was not involved in the unrest. But the French government also accused Azerbaijan of cooperating with Russia and China in New Caledonia, which presents a potential danger for wider Western efforts and interests in both Azerbaijan and the Caucasus.
By portraying Azerbaijan as a Russian-Chinese ally, Macron’s government is creating a major dilemma for France’s Western allies. Azerbaijan is a major oil and gas exporter for many European countries, including Italy, Greece, and Hungary. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has bolstered trade agreements with alternate energy suppliers, including a new deal with Azerbaijan that would double the latter's gas exports to Europe by 2027. Over the past month President Zelenskyy has been open to allowing Azerbaijani gas to cover at least some of the deficits from halting Russian gas trade. Zelenskyy has discussed arrangements with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to facilitate new transit of Azerbaijani gas to Europe. But these agreements have so far faced serious issues, mainly because the EU has been reluctant to offer long-term contracts and significant investment to Azerbaijan. Members of both European and French Parliaments have accused President Aliyev of ‘not being a trustworthy partner' and allegedly exporting Russian gas to Europe rebranded as Azerbaijani, both claims being debunked by the EU Commission.
"Alienating Azerbaijan from the Euro-Atlantic sphere will further strain the already challenging situation of European energy security in the aftermath of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine."
Throughout his Presidency, Ilham Aliyev has proven himself to be a trustworthy partner for states willing to pursue a rational approach towards Azerbaijan, including Italy, the UK, Germany, Spain, and pre-Macron France. Prime Ministers Meloni, Sanchez, and Starmer all attended the COP29 climate summit that took place in Baku last November, where developed countries agreed to channel $1.3 trillion for climate financing towards developing countries over the next decade, dubbed the ‘Baku Breakthrough’ by the UNFCCC. However, Macron’s government boycotted the event after Azerbaijan invited representatives of indigenous communities in French ‘overseas possessions’ during the Summit of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). In response, President Aliyev strongly condemned France’s policy of neocolonialism by marginalising indigenous people from political representation, violating peace agreements in the process, most prominently in New Caledonia.
President Aliyev has praised other Western governments, most prominently the UK and Italy, for their constructive approach to supporting European energy security through sustainability and diversification from Russia. Alienating Azerbaijan from the Euro-Atlantic sphere will further strain the already challenging situation of European energy security in the aftermath of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine. But it is also misleading to assume that the Azerbaijani government would exploit Europe’s weakening position for Russia’s benefit. On Christmas Day last year, a civilian plane of Azerbaijan Airlines, carrying 62 passengers flying from Baku to Grozny was shot down by Russian anti-air missiles. President Aliyev demanded an apology from Vladimir Putin for the accident, alongside acknowledgement for the downing of the plane, however, the Russian President has been reluctant to acknowledge his military’s responsibility. Azerbaijan has also sent significant humanitarian and energy aid to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, and in the last few days, the Azerbaijani government has shut down the representative office of ‘Rossotrudnichestvo,’ a Russian federal agency, in Baku after suspicions of espionage.
Since 2020, President Macron and many French politicians have undone decades of progress in Azerbaijani-French relations and caused great uncertainty in a geopolitically vulnerable region of the world. Last year’s events in New Caledonia only worsened diplomatic discussions between the two states and presented potential risks to COP29 climate negotiations, European energy security, and peacemaking in the Caucasus. Regardless of the provocations from the French government, President Aliyev has supported strong relations with many of France’s allies. He has ramped up oil and gas exports to Europe, despite a lack of EU investment, to fulfil Azerbaijan’s commitments for European states willing to support sensible and friendly relations, and resisted Russia’s irresponsible actions in the region, solidifying himself and Azerbaijan as a reliable partner for Western nations while also defending the rights of marginalised indigenous communities in modern colonial regimes.
Despite the 2020 ceasefire and dissolution of the unrecognised ‘NKR’ entity, the South Caucasus remains a vulnerable region, and Western states need to build constructive relations with the largest Caucasian state, Azerbaijan. With Russian-Azerbaijani relations deteriorating due to irrational Russian foreign policy, there is a perfect opportunity for Western states not to repeat France’s mistakes and instead create a constructive foreign policy approach towards Azerbaijan to ensure the security of European energy long-term, contain Russian influence in the Caucasus, and help bring lasting peace to the region.
Image: Wikimedia Commons
Comments